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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF lJTAH
(;()I_JDRIXG p L\('.1\:IXG l'10., INl'1.,
Plaintiff-Respondent~
YS.

H & :\l l'1ATTLE CO., dba H & l\1 \ Case No.
10091
DRESSED ll E E F CO., and
(~

R E 1\ T WESTERN PACK1:\TG 1\XD l,r\'fTLE CO:\IPAX\ .. , et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STA'fE~IEN'f

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for moneys clain1ed due against
\\~hich defendants claimed a credit for killing 8,151 ewes
for respondent at a charge of $3.00 per head; respondent claimed an oral contract for killing ewes at the rate
of fifty cents per head.

DISPOSITIOX IX

LO,,~ER

COURT

The case \vas tried to a jury which found an oral
contract for killing ewes at fifty cents a head upon
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special interrogatory. From Judgment entered accordingly for the plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during May of 1961, Mr. Henry M.
Hendler, General Manager of Goldring Packing Company, plaintiff and respondent, attended a meeting at
the McFarland packing plant in Salt Lake City with
the following defendants: Ray McFarland, Leonard
0. Thayer, Wayne Hodson, Vance Hodson, Earl Jerry
Morgan and Roy Morgan. (R. 169, 180, 183, 184,
194, 196}. These individuals were seeking ways and
means of creating a unified integrated operation at the
McFarland meat packing plant at 2922 South Main
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 193, 194). Messrs.
Hodsons and Morgans "\\rere officers and principals
in the defendant company, H & M Cattle Company
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as H & M), which,
prior to the meeting with Hendler, had been operating
a "custom kill" slaughtering operation at the McFarland plant (R. 218, 238, 233, Ex. 3}. Mr. Ray McFarland was an employee of H & M Cattle Company
(R. 198, 208). The defendant, Leonard 0. Thayer,
together with H & M and its principals, subsequently
was an incorporator and president of the defendantappellant, Great Western Packing and Cattle Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Great
Western) ( R. 249, Ex. 4) .
4
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~\ t

the n1eeting above referred to, discussion was
held relnti,·e to an agreement for the slaughter of
respondent's liYestock at the :\IcFarland plant. Hendler
otl'ered to supply cattle and sheep belonging to respondent for slaug·hter at the plant; and he offered to
pay for the slaughtering services the su1n of $3.00 per
head for cattle. together 'vith the inedible offal, and
the sun1 of fifty cents per head for sheep (including
both lambs and e\\·es), together 'vith both the edible
nnd inedible offal. Any overtime kill \vas to be compensated for at the rate of an additional fifty cents
per head. Both parties to the agreement were to have
the right to tertninate the same at any time. (R. 169,
170, 196, 197). The consensus of those present was
that this "·as "'fine,'' "·hich they announced. They said
they \\·ould accept it and they all shook hands on it.
(It 17:2, 185. 186, 187, 197). Thereafter, cattle, lambs
and e\ves "·ere submitted by respondent to the defendant H & )! l,attle Cotnpany and its successor, Great
\Y'estern Packing and Cattle Company, the appellant,
and from the lOth day of July, 1961, to and including
the 20th day of September, 1961, these two entities
slaughtered 8,151 of respondent's ewes. (R. 164, 190,
191, Ex. 1). On the 20th day of September, Great
\Y' estern tertninated the agreement because it purportedly could not continue to kill sheep at fifty cents a
head. (R. 18:2. Ex. 1). entil the 4th day of August,
1961, the defendant H & ~I Cattle Company was operating the McFarland plant, custom killing for respondent, and doing business under the assumed name of
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H & M Dressed Beef Co. (R. 198, 219, 220). On the
4th day of August, appellant was incorporated, assumed the operation from H & M, one of the incorpo ..
rators and principal stockholders of appellant and
also did business as H & M Dressed Beef Co. (R. 219,
220, Ex. 2, Ex. 4). Appellant likewise assumed the
obligations of H & M; and it is stipulated below that
Great Western is bound by any agreement found to
exist with H & M. (R. 91-92). Respondent received
from H & M Cattle Company, and later, Great
Western, seven invoices billing respondent at fifty
cents a head for "kill" charges for the weeks ending
July 21, August 4, August 11, August 18, August 25,
September 1 and September 8. (R. 174, Ex. 2). The
invoice No. 3940 for the week ending July 21, 1961,
bills respondent for custom kill charges on 2,469 head
of u sheepn at fifty cents per head. The invoice for
the week ending August 11 bills respondent for kill
charges of uzambs and ewesn at fifty cents per. head.
All other invoices refer only to "lambs" at fifty cents
per head. However, a comparison of the number of
"lambs" shown on these other invoices with the number
of sheep (both lambs and ewes) killed for the same
period as reflected on the kill sheet summary, Exhibit
1, reveals that with two exceptions, the number of lambs
indicated on each of these invoices and billed to respondent at fifty cents a head is, in fact, the total number
of both lambs and ewes killed for that particular week.
This is more graphically demonstrated by the following
chart, to-wit:
6
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PER 1\.ILL SHEET (EX.

Week Ending

.July

~1,

1961
"\ ugust -k 1961
. \ugust 11. 19()1
i\ugust 18, 1961
.~.\ugust :!;), 1961
Sept. 1, 1961
Sept. 8, 1961

1)

No. of
Ewes
killed

No. of
Lambs
killed

Total

No. per
Invoice
(Ex. 2)

1:!H8
987

1171
2129
1784
1161
792
1851
1203

2-:t39
3116
2326
1783
2027
2547
2044

2469*
1584
2296*
1840
2027
2547**
2043**

:)-1<~

()•)•)
_..,

1235
696
841

**X ote: On Invoice for September 8, 1961, it reflects
390 head ''short last billing." This number was added
to the total shown on invoice for week ending Septetnber 1. 1961. and deducted from invoice for week
ending Sepetmber 8, 1961.
*Xote: On Invoice for July 21, 1961, there is a 30 head
discrepancy "·here respondent 'vas billed for 30 more
head than killed. On invoice for August 11, 1961, this
discrepancy is cured by billing for 30 head less than
killed.
'fhe t"~o exceptions illustrated by the above chart
relate to the killing for the weeks ending August 4,
1961. and August 18, 1961. 'fhe number of animals
billed August 4 in the amount of 1,584 compares with
neither the number of lambs nor ewes killed during
that "l'eek, and respondent cannot explain this discrepancy. For the week ending August 18, 1961, Goldring
Packing Company "·as billed for 57 more head than
\vere killed during that week. However, it should be
noted that the number for 'vhich respondent was billed
''·as considerably greater than the number of lambs
7
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only killed during that particular week. The retnaining
five invoices subject to the adjustments noted on the
chart reflect the identical total of both lambs and ewes
killed for the respective week. These billings all were
paid by respondent. (R. 176).

ARGUMEN1,
POINT I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY.
It is axiomatic that on this appeal, this court must
view the evidence below in the light most favorable to
respondent. Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383
P .2d 406 ( 1963) . All of the evidence and every influence
and intendment fairly arising therefrom should be taken
in the light most favorable to the finding made by the
jury below. Rum1nell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137,320 P.2d
653 (1958). Because the principal thrust of appellant's argument attacks the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the jury's finding of an oral contract, extracts of pertinent portions of the testimony of respondent's witness, Henry Hendler, are set forth at some
length, as follows:
"Q. I asked you to relate the substance of the
conversation. What was said at that time?

A. Oh, at that time they were killing or slaughtering, custom slaughtering; and at that time
they asked me whether I would let them custo~
slaughter livestock for our company at their
plant.
8
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(~.

\\'hat did you say to that 1

. _ \. I t houg·ht it \rould be an excellent idea.

Q. \ r as there any discussion at that time with
respect to the ter1ns of this slaughtering arrangement1
'rill~ (_'~QlTl{'f:

or

\'" ou can ans\\·er that 'yes'

~no'.

'rilE \\rl'fNESS: Yes.

:\IR. S.t\PERSTEIN: All right, and what
\ra~ that conversation?

'fHE \\'I 'fNE S S: We evolved terms as follo\\'s: 'fhree Dollars for cattle plus inedibles and
fifty cents for sheep plus inedibles and edibles."
(R. 169, 170).

*

*

*

'fHE \\TI'l,NESS: All right. Ray McFarland, who "·as the spokesman for the group,
accepted this, and said that would be fine with
them, and the rest of them all either kept quiet
or agreed and accepted it.

)IR. SAPERSTEIN: Did anyone indicate
any objection to that price?
'THE \\TITNESS: No. There was a question
at that time as to whether or not ewes would
take a long time to kill and for my firm I explained to them that '"e felt that they could have
the conde1nned carcasses, because through inspection they occasionally condemned carcasses,
and this would giYe them an extra certain amount
that they "·auld have the condemned carcasses
as additional payment for the function which
they could reduce the meat from, which they
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seemed to accept. They said they would accept
it." (R. 172).

*

*

*

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Can you fix the approximate date as to this conversation?
THE WITNESS: It was the early part of
the summer, when this conference was first conceived ,when we made the deal, around May or
something like that.
Q. What was said?

A. I stated to them that we would pay them
fifty cents to kill sheep and that was our deal
and that is all that was to be said. And at that
time they thought they could not function and
if they didn't want to do it they could terminate
it and we reserved the right of termination ourselves.
Q. What did they say in response to that
statement?

A. They accepted it. (R. 180, 181) ."

*

*

*

And on cross-examination:
"Q. And it was Mr. Ray McFarland who
spoke up and said he would kill those ewes for
fifty cents?

A. The group agreed among themselves and
discussed it with me and I discussed it with them.

-·

Q. But to answer my inquiry: which one person?
A. I don't remember which one of them; they
were all speaking to me at that time; each one
had a little something to say.

10
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(~. I think this
:\lc~,arland saying

n1orning you had :\Ir. Ray
that he would do it; is that

true 1
.l\. lie did tnost of the talking. He was the

nH>st kn<nvledgeable one of the group.
(~.

\",. ou didn't actually say 'vhether he said
he ,,·ould do it for fifty cents or not?
..:\. I know he said it. There 'vas agreement
a1nong the group and I had a con1plete understanding 'vith them.

*

*

*

~IR.

l3ERR \T: 'Vhat I 'vould like to be sure
of is that only )lr. ~IcFarland said he would
kill thein for fifty cents?

'filE ''rl'l,NESS: They were all taking part
in the conversation. Ray did most of the talking
and the rest of them all had something to say.
\ y· e "'ere sitting in a group and I was talking to
then1 and they 'vere talking to me, and I said
I "·ould give them fifty cents and that was to
be our price and \ve would not be interested in
paying anything n1ore. And they accepted individually or collectively; they were all sitting
there and I cannot specifically say that Mr. Morgan said 'yes' and the others didn't say anything
I don't know.

*

*

*

'fHE ''riTNESS: Ray McFarland agreed
to it; Leonard Thayer \vas sitting there and
agreed to it; )[organ, he "·as sitting there and I
don't know what he said. I think they were all
sitting· there in front of me and I cannot remember "·hich one 'vas the spokesman because each
11
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one had something to say. But there was a complete meeting of the minds." (R. 185, 186).

*

*

*

*

*

*

"THE WITNESS: They all had something
to say, how nice it was of me to take an interest
in their group and how we were all interested in
getting along together. I was supplementing
their kill, and I told them they should - they
were killing on their own and we were not providing the complete kill for them. They were in
business and we were supplementing their kill.
These were parts of the conversation that took
place and there was agreement. I stated we
would pay fifty cents to kill sheep, no more.
Fine. And we would pay Three Dollars to kill
cattle. Fine. And we all shook hands and went
about our way." (R. 187}.
''Q. Mr. Hendler, Mr. Berry has searched '
your memory to show specifically what one or
the other said. I realize this was a long time ago,
but do you recall what objections, if any, were
made by anyone to this proposal that you stated?

A. One of the questions asked by one of the
less informed of the group, as to the mutton kill:
'Does a ewe kill slower than lambs?' I said,
'Yes ,they are slower. However, you may have
the condemned carcasses.'

*

*

*

THE WITNESS: I told them they would
have the condemned carcasses as additional compensation.
Q. Did anyone object to the proposition?
Did anyone stand up and say: 'I will not go
along with it; or words to that effect?

12
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...:\. Xo. 'rher "·ere all Yery pleased that "·e
''"ere going· to give them material to custom
slnughter.
(~ ... \

ud did ~·ou gtYc thern the 1naterial to

custon1 slaughter?
.t\. \res, \\'e did.
D. Did they slaughter1
1\. \res." ( R. 190, 191).

'ro the sa1ne effect is

the testimony of the defendant. Itay :\lel4'arland, as follows:
~~(~.

Did you at any 1neeting discuss terms
"·ith )lr. Hendler 'vith respect to this kill?

..t\. Yes.
(~.

'''hen did this meeting take place when
you discussed the terms '1
~\.

In the
.. . early
. sun1mer of '61.

(~.

Do you recall 1nore specifically "Then that
tnight have been? ''ras it June or July?
"'\. It
l\Iay.

\\·as

in the first of June or the last of

Q. ,,. . here did this meeting take place?

A. It took place in the same conference room.
Q. And who \vas present at that time?
A . .Jerry ~Iorgan, ''rayne Hodson and Leonard 'fhayer.

Q. And was _jir. Hendler there?
. .-\.. \"'" es.

13
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Q. All right. Now relate the conversation at

that time with respect to terms.
( 0 bj ection interposed at this time)
MR. SAPERSTEIN: All right, now; you
may answer.
THE WITNESS: We first started discussing custom cattle killing, because that was what
was more in our line at that particular time, and
we determined upon three dollars a head for
killing cattle. Then we got into killing sheep~ and
Mr. Hendler said he would offer. us fifty cents
a head for killing sheep.
Q. Who was to retain the pelt?

A. Goldring was to retain the pelt.
Q. Who was to have the offal of the sheep?

A. We were to have the edible and inedible
offal.
Q. And what did you say in response to the
propositon made by Mr. Hendler.
A. We agreed.
Q. Was there any comment from any of the
other individuals present at the time?
A. They agreed.
Q. I beg pardon?
A. They agreed.
Q. Subsequent to that, Mr. McFarland, did
the Goldring Packing Company submit sheep
to be slaughtered there at the McFarland plant?
A. Yes, later; and we killed cattle.
Q. Cattle and sheep were submitted to you?

14
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"'\. (,orrect.
(~. ~ \ nd

they \vere killed '1

.. \. 'rlu.'y \vere." (ll. 195,

196~

197).

l~:,·idenee

substantiating ~Icl~.,arland's and Hendler's testiJnony as to an oral contract having been
nuule at the rneeting above referred to is contained in
Exhibit ~~ the series of billings received by respondent
frorn II . '\.. :\1 l~attle Cotnpany and later, Great Western. 'rhese doctnnents bill respondent for slaughtering
respondent's e\\'es at the agreed charge of fifty cents
per head. Although five of the seven invoices use the
word, \'latnbs", as illustrated, supra, the number of
unin1nls sho,vn on the invoice was the total of both the
larnhs and ewes killed in the period covered by the
billing. Respondent honored these billings by payment
accordingly.
'fhe logical import of these invoices is that there
was a contract bet,veen the parties whereby H & M
Cattle Cotnpany was to kill ewes at the rate of fifty
l'ents per head. Other,vise, H & M, and later, Great
,,. . estern, \Vould presumably have billed respondent at
some other figure. All of the invoices, with one exception. \vere prepared by a Mr. W. Dennis Couch, a
\vitness ealled by appellant, who was, in his own words,
"office manager. collections manager, and the general
fellow to run the plant." (R. 252, 253). Mr. Couch
adn1itted on cross-examination that at the time in question he had about "five different bosses," including Jerry
)!organ. Leonard Thayer, ''rayne Hodson, Roy Mor-
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gan, all of whom were principals in either H & M Cattle
Company or the appellant, Great Western Packing
and Cattle Company, or both. (R. 255, Ex. 3, Ex. 4).
Couch, despite his protestations to the effect that he
had been advised by his "bosses" only with respect to
the agreement between the parties as to the amount
to be charged for killing lambs and killing cattle, but
not ewes, he nevertheless admitted that he did not bill
respondent more than fifty cents for ewes because he
knew an amount in excess of fifty cents would not be
paid. ( R. 258, 259) .
As discussed infra, these invoices have additional
significance as part of the acts, conduct and declarations
of H & M Cattle Company, which conduct and declarations per se may properly be considered by the jury
as an acceptance of respondent's offer.
That the oral agreement existed is given further
credence by Hendler's testimony that appellant terminated the agreement because it could not "economically
kill at fifty cents per head." (R. 182). Appellant explains that this statement related only to lambs, a contention the jury justifiably rejected in light of the fact
that it was made after appellant and H & M had admittedly killed 8,151 ewes.
It is submitted that the evidence relative to the
meeting between Hendler and the principals of H & M
Cattle Company, standing alone, was amply sufficient
for the jury to determine that an oral agreement for
the killing of ewes at the rate of fifty cents a head had

16
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at the titne of the meeting. \ \rhen this evidence is vie\\·ed in the light of the undisputed fact that
s, I.> 1 e\ves 'vere, in fact, killed and that respondent
was billed for tnost of this number (no billings were
recei,·ed for the \veeks ending September 15 and Septeinher ~~) at the rate of fifty cents per head, appellant's
nrgurnent, it is submitted, is somewhat less than com•
pelling.
been struck

It is further submitted that the jury could have
nlso based its finding of an oral contract by viewing
II & ~I's conduct in killing Goldring ewes, charging
fifty cents per head therefor, and accepting payment
paytnent thereof, as constituting an acceptance of the
offer made by respondent at the May meeting.
\ \rhether the contract be bilateral or unilateral, it
is respectfully submitted that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that there was, in
fact, an oral agreement to kill ewes at fifty cents per
head .
..-\.ppellant attacks the foregoing evidence as being
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the jury's finding of an oral contract between the parties. This attack
is based essentially upon four assertions:
(I) That the offer made by Goldring was made to
a "group'', not H & M Cattle Company as such, and
that, therefore, H & l\1 Cattle Company could not
accept the offer, not being the offeree;
(2) That the period from 1\'Iay to August 17,
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1964, the date of the written agreement (Exhibit

5), was simply a period of negotiation and that the
offer made by Goldring with respect to the killing of
ewes at fifty cents per head was not only rejected hr
the defendants but revoked by respondent prior to
acceptance ;
(3) That since there is no testimony to the effect
that one or more of the principals of H & M Cattle
Company by name said, '"I accept", the silence of the

individuals involved cannot be construed as an acceptance; and

( 4) That the only evidence of record to substantiate the finding of an oral contract are the "conclusions" of the witness Hendler.
Taking each of these contentions in their order
above stated, let us first examine the proposition advanced that there can be no oral contract as a matter of
law because the offer made by Goldring Packing Company was not accepted by the offeree. This assertion
is based upon the fallacious assumption that the offer
made by respondent at the meeting in May of 1961
was made to some shapeless entity yet to be formed.
The facts are, of course, otherwise. The offer was made
to the individuals present, four of whom were officers
and principals of H & 1\ti Cattle Company, one of
whom was subsequently an incorporator and president
of the appellant Great Western Packing and Cattle
Company. The meeting was held with these persons
because through H & M they were and would be the
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ones operuting the ~Ic~.,arland plant; and these individuals through the entities of H & :\1 l'1attle Company
and (~rent \\"'estern Packing and Cattle Company, did,
in fact, then and thereafter operate the ~IcFarland
plant. 'ro say, therefore, that no offer 'vas made to
II & ~I l"'attle Con1pany is not only to ignore the realities of the situation apparent from the record, but to
sotneho'v argue for a separation of a corporate entity
fron1 its flesh and blood agents. In so doing, appellant
is foisting upon this court its own view of the evidence,
not the vie"' to "' hich the evidence is susceptible and to
which obv·iously the jury subscribed. See Ortega v.
Thomas, supra.
)loreover, appellant misconceives thP. application
of the rule of la"r 'vhich it attempts to assert. No one
'rill quarrel "·ith appellant's assertion that if X makes
an offer for services to be performed by Y, and Z seeks
to perfor1n those services, that X cannot be bound
absent his consent. The reason for the rule is that X
is entitled to contract with whomsoever he pleases. However, applying this doctrine to the instant case, appellant places itself in the peculiar position of urging the
court to defeat the rights of the offeror by a rule of law
clearly developed to preserve the rights of the offeror.
The point is that under any view of the evidence,
respondent "·as obviously "pleased" to deal with H & M
Cattle Con1pany and accepted the tendered performance by H & ~I. The rule is one devised for the protection of the offeror not for the protection of the
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acceptor; and if a stranger to the offer perfortns in
accordance therewith, and the offeror permits perfornlance, the tender of the performance is in essence a new
offer and the receipt of the performance is an acceptance thereof. I Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed., Sec.
80, p. 265. Accordingly, even under appellant's view of
the evidence, a binding contract resulted.
With respect to appellant's second contention, it
is once again rather clear that this contention is also
grounded upon certain assumptions that can be made
only by viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the appellant, not the respondent. The written contract (Ex. 5) introduced by appellant, according to
appellant's own theory of the case, is silent with respect
to the killing of ewes. It is therefore difficult to perceive how it can ipso facto constitute either a rejection
or a revocation of an offer concerning a subject matter it
does not purport to cover; and the jury was, therefore,
properly given the opportunity to supplement the same
by finding an oral agreement with respect to ewes in accordance with respondent's evidence. McCarren v. Merrill_, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 389 P .2d 732, 733, (March, I964) ;
Charlton v. Hackett_, II Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176,
( 1961).
· This argument also overlooks the rather elementary precept that when an offer is accepted, a contract
results, and accordingly, there is no longer extant an
offer to be either revoked or rejected. The bargain 'vith
H & M had been struck long before August I7, 1961.
20
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~:\s

discussed, supra, the jury could haYe found an
uct·cptance ot' respondent's offer at either the meeting
of the pnrties in )lay or by the killing of respondent's
ewes in July and thereafter and the billing therefor upon
respondent's terms.
'ro say that the written contract, appellant's Exhibit 6, conclusively proves that the parties were merely
negotiating from May to August 17, 1961, is to once
again ignore the evidence of record detailed above, to
\vit: the meeting in May, the actual submission of ewes
by respondent to H & M and the slaughtering thereof
before and after August 17, 1961, the date of the agreernent; and the billings therefor at the rate of fifty cents
per head in accordance with respondent's offer.
\\rith respect to appellant's third contention enumerated above, once again appellant requires respondent
to argue facts rather than law. rrhis contention assumes,
of course, that there was, in fact, silence upon the part
of the principal officers of H & M Cattle Company
in response to the offer made by Hendler during the
)lay meeting. It is respectfully submitted that the jury
could readily infer from the testimony of record detailed above that there was acceptance by all of the
parties present at the time of the meeting. Assuming
arguendo only, that H & M was silent, appellant erroneously assumes that there was no duty to speak on
the part of the principals of H & ~1 Cattle Company.
It is respectfully submitted that in logic and good
reason "·herft_an offer is made to five persons, so closely
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inter-related in the operation of the packing plant as
were those five at that meeting in May, if the principals
of H & M Cattle Company were not to be bound by
an acceptance of the offer made at the time of this conference, then in light of all the facts and circumstances
then existing and the interrelationship of those present,
they were duty bound to so state. I Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed., Sec. 91B, P. 328. The evidence is undisputed that no one voiced an objection to such acceptance or to doing business with respondent upon the
terms offered by Hendler. The evidence, moreover, is
abundant that such business was in fact thereafter
conducted with Goldring Packing Company upon the
basis of the very terms proposed at the meeting.
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument,
that there was not an acceptance at the date of the
conference in May, the evidence, as discussed, supra,
shows an acceptance of the offer made by the subsequent
conduct of H & M Cattle Company; and therefore,
there is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to sustain the
jury's finding, even assuming appellant's own view of
the evidence to be correct. An offer was made by Hendler whereby ewes were to be submitted for slaughter
at the rate of fifty cents per head. Thereafter, ewes
were in fact submitted to H & M Cattle Company for
slaughter. H & M Cattle Company slaughtered the
ewes and billed for its services at the rate of fifty cents
per head. It is difficult to imagine an acceptance by
more unequivocal conduct than this. Appellant's entire
thesis on this appeal seems to be that an oral contract
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is i1npossihle to be for1ned in the absence of the offeree
raising his hand, standing upon his feet and stating
with due forrnality, "I accept your offer; we now have
a contract." 'fhis thesis not only ignores the realities of
the business \vorld in general and the meat packing
business in particular, but it ignores, as well, the established la"· on the subject. 'fhe authorities are unanirnous in holding that conduct may constitute an acceptance. RadletJ v. S11tith, 6 Utah 2d 31-:t, 313 P.2d 465,
(19t>7): R. ,J. Dau1n Constr·uction Co. v. Child~ 122
trtah 194, 2 t7 P.2d 817 ( 1952) ; 'l'hornton v. Pasch_,
104 Utah 313, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 ( 1943); In re
/Jan.gdon·'s Estate, 195 P.2d 317 (Kan., 1948}. In the
last cited case, the court pronounced the rule in the
following appropriate language:
~·It

is true no exp~ess 'vritten agreement was
shown but that was unnecessary. Parties may
be bound as firmly by implied contracts ·as by
those expressed in words, oral or written. The
la"· itnplies fro1n circumstances and the silent
language of men's conduct and actions, contracts
and promises as forcible and binding as those
made by express words or through the medium
of \vritten memorials."
The fourth contention made by the appellant is
that the only evidence of record to substantiate the
finding of a parol contract was the testimony of Mr.
Hendler and that his testimony with respect to showing such an acceptance constitutes his opinions or conclusions only. Not only does appellant ignore the testimony of Ray )lcFarland, but once again, appellant
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ignores the concept that conduct may constitute acceptance and in so doing ignores the evidence relating
thereto that has been reiterated so many times in this
brief.
Hendler's and McFarland's testimony relating to
acceptance at the meeting supplied the jury with the
basis for an alternative finding of acceptance. It was
not the only evidence of record. As indicated above, the
evidence relating to acceptance by conduct is also ample
to support the jury's verdict. Additionally, it is submitted that much of the testimony quoted above did
not constitute bald conclusions. Much of this testimony
is as susceptible of the interpretation that what is being
recited was what was actually said as it is susceptible
of appellant's contention that it is the witness's mental
impressions only. As stated at 20 Am. J ur., Evidence,
Sec. 771:
"The general rule excluding opinions of witnesses is simple in statement, but not so simple
in application, for it is not always easy to distinguish in the testimony of a witness facts
within his knowledge or observation from his
opinions on facts. As a general rule, a witness
may testify directly to a compq,site fact although
in a sense his testimony may include his conclusion from other facts. * * * The true solution
seems to be that such questions are left for the
practical discretion of the trial court."
Moreover, assuming arguendo only, that Hendler's
testimony with respect to acceptance of his offer at the
time of the meeting was principally conclusions, all
24
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ot' the testin1ouy quoted, ~upra, \Vas recei,·ed without
uhjection or tnotion tu strike by appellant and a great
denl ot' it \vas actually elicited on cross-examination.,
It is '"ell-established hnv that objections not made to
the adtnissihility of such evidence are lost on appeal;
and such evidence, though constituting conclusions, in
the absence of objection, is competent to support the
jury's findings.
20 .i-\m. J ur., Evidence, Sec. 1185, states the rule
us follows :

"'I'he fact that evidence which is introduced
in a case may be, if objected to, incompetent
evidence under some one or more exclusionary
rule of evidence, do~s not destroy its probative
effect if it is admitted without objection. It is the
generally prevailing rule that relevant evidence
received \vithout objection may properly be considered, although it would have been excluded
if objection had been made. Such evidence, where
admitted 'vithout objection, has the force and
effect of proper evidence and is to be accorded
its natural probative effect as though it were
adtnissible under the established rules of practice."
At the annotation appearing at 120 A.L.R 213, it
is stated that the overwhelming majority of the cases
in this country on the subject agree that objectionable
conclusion evidence should be given consideration in
ruling upon a motion for non-suit or directed verdict.
4-\nd, in 5 Am. J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 737,
p. 182, the rule is stated thusly:
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"Where evidence, although inadmissible on
proper objection, is received below without objection, the court, on appeal, may properly consider it in support of the decision of the trial
court.''
POIN'f 2. EXHIBIT 2 WAS PROPERL"\r
ADMITTED OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION THAT IT WAS HEARSAY.
Appellant contends that the billings contained in
Exhibit 2 constitute hearsay testimony and that the
same were improperly admitted over objection. As
pointed out earlier in this brief, these billings, together
with other conduct by H & M, could per se have been
considered by the jury as constituting the acceptance
of Hendler's offer. When thus viewed, the billings take
on an importance independent of the declarations
therein contained. The very fact that these billings were
rendered now becomes significant. Much like a verbal
utterance of acceptance, the fact that the utterance
was made, not the truth or falsity thereof, is the purpose
of the testimony. It was stated by this court in Hawkins
v. Perry~ 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372, 374 (1953}, as
follows:

" * * * Perry's statements at the time of the
transaction were not declarations as to some
antecedent happening which the percipient witnesses are relating to us second-hand. They are
the verbal acts which go to make up the very
transaction which is under scrutiny to determine
its legal effect. The fact that promises and representations were made is material to the issues
26
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of this aetion; thev do not e,·idence 'the truth
of the tna tter * * . * asserted therein * * *,' at
least in the sense that \ \rigmore uses that phrase.
"

...

'fhe foll<nving pronouncement by the Supreme
Court of Colorado is also appropriate here:

* * * In ulti1nately excluding exhibit B, the
court as like,vise did plaintiff's counsel in objecting to the court's admission of exhibits C
and D, misapprehend the purpose of these exhibits. 1\s already noted the company is relying
upon its oral contract, and plaintiff denies any
such contract. 'Vhere the existence of an alleged
oral contract is the main issue involved in a case,
as here, and the making of the 'oral contract is
disputed, all the acts and declarations of the
parties tending to establish or refute it are admissible, together with all the facts connected
with the history of the transaction, and the surrounding· circumstances. * * * ' The obtaining
of exhibits B, c., a:q<J D tend·s strongly to establish the oral contract upon which defendant relies." Andrenw 'L'. Costilla -Ditch Co., 165 P.2d
188, (Colo., 1945).
~'

Assunling arguendo only, that these billings constituted hearsay in the sense that their introductior1
\\·as for the purpose of establishing the tr~th of the
declarations contained therein, they were properly
adnussible on the basis of the most elementary exception
to the hearsay rule, to wit: as admissions against interest. 'fhese billings were prepared by W. Dennis
Couch, who as the statement of facts above indicates,
\Vas in fact the plant manager, the person who ran the
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office, and the person responsible for obtaining money
to keep the plant in operation during this period. llis
bosses were all principals of H & M Cattle Company and later the principals of the respondent Great
Western Packing and Cattle Company. It was his duty
to raise money, his duty to bill for services performed.
In pursuit of his duty, he had admittedly billed Goldring Packing Company on H & M Cattle Company
statements over the assumed name of H & M Dressed
Beef Company. To say, as appellant says, that these
billings were not sent out in the course and scope of
Couch's employment and to say further that Couch
was not an agent of H & M Cattle Company and later
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company, the
appellant, is once again to pervert the facts on this
appeal. 'Vhere a declaration is made by an agent acting
within the course and scope of his employment that
declaration is clearly admissible as against the principal
as an admission against interest. 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, Sec. 596, p. 505; John G. Hendrie Co. v. Industrial Commission~ 12 Utah 2d 80, 362 P.2d 752 (1961).
Appellant, however, argues that Couch testified
that he was never advised that there was a contract
between H & M Cattle Company and respondent with
respect to the killing ewes. Such testimony would
affect the weight to be given to the documents, not
their admissibility. Moreover, it is apparent that the
jury, as was its province, rejected Couch's assertion.
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'rhe cotnment of Justice l,rockett In the case of
JlcCarren ·cs. Jlcrrill, supra, seems appropriate In
summation of this brief:
uThe resolution of the dispute in this case is
governed by the old and oft repeated rule that
where the evidence is in conflict, it is the trial
court's prerogatiYe to believe that which he finds
more convincing, and his findings will not be
disturbed on appeal so long as there is some substantial evidence to support them."
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
judgment entered below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Herschel J. Saperstein
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City II, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
Dated:

)lay
,.,

27, 1964.

29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

